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GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER'S STRICT
SCRUTINY DICHOTOMY:
DIVERSITY IS A COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST, BUT THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS
PLAN IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED
I. INTRODUCTION
After twenty-five years of increasing speculation and obfuscation
surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,' the Supreme Court revisited the issue of affirmative
action in higher education in a pair of 2003 cases arising out of the admissions
policies at the University of Michigan. a The Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence between Bakke and the 2003 University of Michigan cases
seemed to erode many of the principles enunciated by Justice Powell in his
decisive Bakke opinion. What is more, appellate courts reviewing university
affirmative action admissions programs expressed lingering doubts about the
precedential weight of Justice Powell's opinion.4 The Court granted certiorari
in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger "to resolve the disagreement...
on a question of national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling
interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting
applicants for admission to public universities.",
5
The Court in Grutter correctly concluded that diversity is a compelling
state interest;6 however, this Comment argues that the Court erred in
concluding that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1996); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9thCir. 2000).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
4. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 974; Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01.
5. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322. Challenges to governmentally created race-based classifications
are subjected by courts to the strict scrutiny standard. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06. The strict
scrutiny standard contains two prongs: (1) the government must advance a compelling state interest
for creating its race-based classifications; and (2) the classifications must be narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest. Id.
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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was narrowly tailored to achieve diversity. Accordingly, the Court should
have struck down the school's program as unconstitutional.
Michigan's admissions plan does not conform to the mandates of narrow
tailoring for two reasons. First, the plan is impermissibly underinclusive. 7
Second, Michigan failed to sufficiently consider race-neutral alternatives
before installing its race-based plan 8 and failed to identify a deadline on
which it would cease accounting for prospective students' race when
evaluating their suitability for admission. 9  Moreover, to conclude that
Michigan had indeed properly considered race-neutral alternatives to its
program and that it would no longer consider race in admissions when
"practicable,"' the Court disregarded the federal district court's findings of
fact, and instead yielded to Michigan's "academic freedom" to choose its
class of students." The Court's deference to the school is misplaced; the
Constitution does not permit a public university to invoke its First
Amendment "academic freedom" to do what is otherwise prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 12
Economic affirmative action plans present a remedy to the problems
bedeviling race-based affirmative action programs such as the one at issue in
Grutter. First, economic affirmative action plans provide greater
inclusiveness than race-based plans because all individuals from depressed
socio-economic backgrounds may qualify for preference regardless of their
race. Second, economic affirmative action programs counteract the problems
inherent in the subjective evaluation of whether universities sufficiently
considered race-neutral alternatives before adopting race-based plans because
such plans are already intrinsically race neutral. Third, educational and legal
benefits attend economic affirmative action programs. For instance, such
programs serve the goal of providing equal opportunity of education.' 3
Additionally, because racial minorities comprise a disproportionate number of
the nation's poor, universities seeking to obtain the compelling state interest
of student body diversity may be able to do so through race-neutral, class-
based admissions programs. 14 Finally, economic affirmative action programs
supply universities the legal benefit of likely having challenges to such
programs reviewed under the rational basis review standard rather than the
7. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851-52 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
8. Id. at 852.
9. Id. at 851.
10. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
11. Id. at 339-40.
12. Id. at 363 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. See id. at 331-32 (majority opinion).
14. See infra Part VI.B.
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more stringent strict scrutiny standard.15
This Comment will examine the alternate outcomes courts have reached
when applying strict scrutiny to the diversity rationale offered by institutions
of higher education as a justification for creating racial classifications. Part II
probes court decisions ruling on the constitutionality of admissions programs
that classify students based on race where educational diversity was invoked
as a justification for such classifications. Part III asserts that beyond the
policy rationales, educational diversity is a compelling interest rooted in
constitutional precepts. Part IV examines the divergent findings of the federal
district court and the Supreme Court in Grutter on the question of whether the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions plan is narrowly tailored to
achieve student body diversity. Part V explains that the Supreme Court
should have found the admissions plan at issue in Grutter unconstitutional
because it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve educational
diversity. Part VI offers an alternative to the admissions plan at issue in
Grutter, contending that an admissions plan that creates predominately socio-
economic classifications, rather than racial classifications, is indeed narrowly
tailored. Finally, Part VII contains this Comment's conclusions.
II. THE DIVERSITY CONTROVERSY: IS STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY A
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST?
Part II traces three leading cases in which diversity was invoked as a
compelling state interest to justify a university's creation of racial
classifications for its admissions plan. The Court first examined the question
in Bakke, where diversity was accepted as a compelling state interest.' 6
Eighteen years later, however, in Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the Court's intervening affirmative action decisions had
eviscerated Bakke's conclusion, and thus rejected diversity as a compelling
state interest. 17  The federal district court in Grutter embraced the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning to also conclude diversity does not constitute a compelling
interest. 18  But the Supreme Court overruled the federal district court in
Grutter to provide the final word on the question: The Court reaffirmed
Bakke's conclusion that educational diversity remains a compelling state
interest in the context of higher education. 19
15. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.).
17. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847-50 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
2006]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke: The Constitution
"Clearly " Permits Universities to Use Racial Preferences to Obtain a Diverse
Student Body
After Alan Bakke was twice denied admission into the University of
California at Davis Medical School ("UC-Davis"), he brought suit alleging
the school's admissions program-which reserved sixteen slots out of a class
of 100 for members of certain minority groups-violated his equal protection
rights. 20 The university advanced the following four justifications for its
special admissions program: (1) "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession"; 21 (2)
countering the effects of societal discrimination; (3) increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and (4)
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student
body.22
The Bakke Court splintered into three factions, resulting in the absence of
a controlling majority opinion:23 Four of the Justices declined to reach the
constitutional question and struck down the admissions program at issue on
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-79.
21. Id. at 306 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811)).
22. Id.
23. The Bakke Court divided into three camps. Justice Stevens issued an opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). These four Justices voted to strike down
UC-Davis's admissions program on grounds that it violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 421. Accordingly, the Stevens four did not evaluate the constitutionality of the program. Id. at
412.
A second group of four Justices-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun-submitted
a joint opinion in which they concluded that both Title VI and the Constitution permitted UC-Davis
to "take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice." Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., White, J.,
Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
Brennan group joined the portion of Justice Powell's opinion that reversed the California Supreme
Court's holding that an educational institution may never consider an applicant's race. Id. at 320.
However, Justice Powell joined the Stevens group in ruling that the UC-Davis program was
ultimately unlawful, albeit on different grounds. Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.). While the
Stevens group declared the program unlawful as a violation of federal law, see id. at 421 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), Justice Powell found the program
constitutionally problematic because the quota system did not constitute a narrowly tailored means
for achieving student body diversity, id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.). In a separate tie-breaking
opinion, Justice Powell announced that public universities have a compelling interest in maintaining
a diverse student body. Id. at 311.
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statutory grounds; 24 a group of four other Justices would have upheld the
program as a justifiable remedy for "disadvantages cast on minorities by past
racial prejudice"; 25 and Justice Powell, while joining four of his colleagues in
voting to strike down the program, wrote for himself in finding the admissions
program unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 26  Justice Powell
reasoned that, while diversity was a sufficiently compelling justification for
creating limited racial classifications, the UC-Davis admissions program was
unconstitutional because it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve
educational diversity.27
Justice Powell's decisive opinion began by identifying that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard by which to evaluate racial classifications.28
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort," he declared, "are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination., 29 Thus, the
Court required UC-Davis to show that the racial classifications contained in
its special admissions program were justified by a "constitutionally
permissible and substantial" purpose and that the use of those classifications
was necessary to achieve the school's purpose.30
Under the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Powell accepted only the fourth
rationale as constitutionally permissible.3' Justice Powell held that an
institution of higher education's goal of achieving a diverse student body was
"clearly" permitted by the Constitution.32 The First Amendment preserves a
university's academic freedom to choose its teaching methods, curriculum,
faculty, and students.3 3 Academic freedom prevails in the "atmosphere of
'speculation, experiment and creation"' resulting from the "robust exchange
24. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.).
27. Id. at 314-19.
28. See id. at 290-91.
29. Id. at 291.
30. Id. at 305.
31. Id. at 311-12. As to the first rationale, Justice Powell said that the purpose of obtaining a
specified percentage of racial and ethnic minorities for no reason other than their race or ethnic origin
is "facially invalid" as "discrimination for its own sake." Id. at 307. In dismissing the second
rationale, he called the interest of "ameliorating[] or eliminating... the disabling effects of identified
discrimination... an amorphous concept ... that may be ageless in its reach into the past." Id.
Finally, Justice Powell discarded the proffered interest of improving health-care services and access
to under-served communities because UC-Davis presented no evidence that its special admissions
program furthered that interest. Id. at 311.
32. Id. at 311-12.
33. Id. at 312.
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of ideas" produced by a diverse student body.34
While Justice Powell embraced racial diversity as a compelling interest,
he and a majority of the Court struck down the UC-Davis admissions plan as
unconstitutional because the plan's racial classifications did not promote that
interest.35 Justice Powell wrote, "[tihe diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element. [UC-Davis's] special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic
diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity. 36
Hence, the UC-Davis program was marred by the fact that sixteen seats were
insulated from the possibility of being filled by nonminority students, and
therefore all applicants could not compete for every available seat. Simply,
UC-Davis's quota plan failed constitutional litmus because it disregarded
individual rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.37
Though Justice Powell concluded that a quota plan does not permissibly
further "genuine diversity," he also concluded that plans that consider an
applicant's race among a host of other factors 38 are constitutionally
permissible.39 Under such plans, race is considered a "plus," rather than as
determinative, and, therefore, they satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's
mandate that government treat individuals equally.4 °
B. Hopwood v. Texas: "Remedying Past Wrongs " Is the Only Compelling
Interest Justifying Racial Preferences
Relying on the Supreme Court's affirmative action case law since Bakke,
the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas, found the University of Texas Law
School's admissions program, which favored blacks and Mexican Americans,
unconstitutional. 41 Because the admissions program classified applicants on
the basis of race, the Fifth Circuit subjected it to strict scrutiny.42 Thus, the
34. Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
35. Id. at 314-15.
36. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 320.
38. The factors include the following: "exceptional personal talents, unique work or service
experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important." Id. at
317.
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id.
41. 78 F.3d 932, 934-36 (5th Cir. 1996).
42. Id. at 940.
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law school bore the burden of proving that (1) the racial classification
furthered a compelling state interest, and (2) the admissions program was
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.43 The court concluded, however,
that the law school presented no compelling justification for preferring blacks
and Mexican Americans over all others."
The law school put forth two justifications for its admissions program: (1)
obtaining the educational benefits that result from assembling a diverse
student body and (2) remedying the effects of past discrimination 5 In a two-
part opinion, the Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments, finding neither
sufficiently compelling to warrant the use of racial preferences in the school's
admissions policy.
46
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke found that "diversity is a sufficient justification for limited
racial classification. 47  For three reasons, however, the court refused to
accept diversity as a compelling state interest.
48
First, the court noted that the portion of the Bakke opinion that embraced
the diversity rationale received only Justice Powell's endorsement.49
Moreover, the court continued, diversity had never been found to constitute a
compelling interest by a majority of the Supreme Court under strict scrutiny
analysis.50 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Justice Powell's
43. Id.
44. Id. at 934. Because the Fifth Circuit did not find student body diversity to be a compelling
interest, it declined to consider, in accordance with the second prong of the strict scrutiny standard,
whether the University of Texas plan was narrowly tailored to further the school's interest in
achieving such diversity. Id.
45. Id. at 938.
46. See id. at 941-55.
47. Id. at 942-43.
48. See id. at 944-48.
49. Id. at 944.
50. Id. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), embraced the justification of
"broadcast diversity" within the context of a federal statute creating preferences for minority
controlled radio and television stations when issuing broadcast licenses. Id. at 566. However, Metro
Broadcasting held that racial classifications created by Congress should be accorded more deference
than those originating in statehouses and city council chambers and should, therefore, be subject to
only intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny: "We hold that benign race conscious measures
mandated by Congress . . .are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." Id. at 565.
In Bakke and in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 467 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court
embraced the diversity rationale and, unlike Metro Broadcasting, deployed the weapon of strict
scrutiny while reaching its conclusion; however, both of those opinions were plurality opinions in
which the sections discussing the standard of review did not muster a majority vote. See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 408 U.S. 265, 299 (1978); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74.
Finally, Croson marked the first time a majority of the Court subjected a race-based affirmative
2006]
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view in Bakke did not represent binding precedent. 51
Next, the court underscored how subsequent case law since Bakke had
effectively eroded the notion that diversity could serve as a compelling state
52interest . The only case since Bakke in which the Supreme Court accepted
the diversity rationale was Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC;53 however, in
that case, the Court subjected the racial classification at issue to merely
intermediate scrutiny, rather than to strict scrutiny. 54  Regardless, Metro
Broadcasting was later overruled by the Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
55
decision, which "squarely rejected intermediate scrutiny as the standard of
review for racial classifications. ' 6 In addition, the Fifth Circuit emphasized
that City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 57 held that "remedying past wrongs"
is the "only ... compelling state interest to justify racial classifications."' 58
Thus, it remained that no majority had ever adopted the diversity rationale as
compelling, and indeed the seemingly only compelling justification for
governmentally created racial classifications was to remedy the effects of past
discrimination.5 9
Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejected the diversity rationale because the court
found it to be inimical to the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of ending
racially motivated state action. 60 Diversity, as a catalyst for classification by
race, "contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection," the court
stated. 61 "It may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote
improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility.,
62
The second part of the Fifth Circuit's analysis concentrated on whether the
remedial purpose of the school's admission program constituted a compelling
state interest. 63 The court initially determined that the alleged harm must be
action program to strict scrutiny. Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).
However, the Court retreated from maintaining "diversity" as a compelling justification. It stated,
"[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved
for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility." .Id. at 493.
51. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
52. Id. at 944-45.
53. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
54. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
55. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
56. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
57. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
58. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
59. See id. at 944-45.
60. Id. at 948-49.
61. Id. at 945.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 949.
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caused by the specific state actor-in this case the University of Texas Law
School.64 Thus, the court rejected any notion that the law school's admissions
program was permissible as a remedy for past racial discrimination
perpetrated by either the State of Texas or the University of Texas System.
65
The court next determined that it was incumbent upon the law school to prove
that the effects of past discrimination by the law school itself justified its
admission program and that the school had constructed its program
"specifically to remedy the identified present effects of the past
discrimination.,
66
The law school attempted to defend its racial preferences as a means for
remedying three deleterious effects of past racial discrimination: (1) the law
school's ongoing reputation among minority populaces as being a "white"
school; (2) the lingering perception that the school's environment is hostile
toward minorities; and (3) the under-representation of minorities within the
law school student body.67
The Fifth Circuit rejected all three claims.68
The court first concluded that the school's poor reputation among
minorities was linked solely to the mere knowledge that it had refused to
admit African Americans at some point in its history.69 Such knowledge of
historical fact, the court asserted, did not constitute the type of effect that
justifies race-based admissions policies. 70
Second, the court dismissed the hostile environment argument, contending
that there existed no evidence of any action by the school that contributed to
hostility toward minorities. 71 Accordingly, if any such hostility pervaded at
the school, the court noted, it resulted from societal discrimination, which, if
anything, was compounded by "the overt and prevalent consideration of race
in admissions. 72
Finally, the court tackled the law school's argument that its admissions
program passed constitutional muster because it attempted to remedy past
discrimination by admitting a percentage of minorities commensurate with
Texas's minority population.73 The court dismissed the argument because the
64. Id. at 952.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 952-54.
69. Id. at 952.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 953.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 954.
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State of Texas and its universities, not the law school, had discriminated
against racial minorities.74 Croson, it noted, "unequivocally restricted the
proper scope of the remedial interest to the state actor that had previously
discriminated.,
75
In sum, Hopwood rejected each of the University of Texas Law School's
policy justifications for its affirmative action admissions policy. Hopwood
embodies the proposition that strict scrutiny recognizes no non-remedial
interest, including diversity, as sufficiently compelling to justify government-
imposed racial classifications.76 Neither the educational benefits flowing
from a diverse student populace, nor the corrective purpose of shedding a
poor reputation among minorities, nor the inclination to eradicate a hostile
environment sufficed as a compelling interest.77 Moreover, the court found
the school's defense that it was attempting to compile a class of law students
reflective of Texas's general population likewise uncompelling.78 The court
declared that remedying the present effects of prior discrimination by the
specific state actor is the only governmental interest worthy of satisfying the
strict scrutiny standard where racial classifications are invoked. '
C. Grutter v. Bollinger in the Federal District Court: Educational Diversity
Is a "Laudable, "but not a "Compelling, "Interest
The federal district court decision in Grutter v. Bollinger echoed the
Hopwood decision. It found the University of Michigan Law School's
admissions program, which is designed to admit a "critical mass" of selected
racial minorities-namely blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans-
constitutionally flawed. 80
Michigan explained that the purpose of its program is to obtain the
educational benefits that flow from diversity. 81 Moreover, the school displays
a commitment to one type of diversity-racial and ethnic diversity.82  To
achieve educational diversity, the program is designed to enroll a "critical
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the
Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 395 (1998).
77. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 942-62.
80. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
81. Id. at 840.
82. Id. at 827.
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mass"--or "meaningful numbers"-of minority students. 83  The goal, in
short, is to enroll a number of minority students sufficient to allow them to
contribute to classroom dialogue without feeling isolated.84
The school insisted that it is imperative to consider race to achieve such
critical mass.85 In fact, members of targeted minority groups would not be
admitted in significant numbers, Michigan contended, unless race is explicitly
considered because, on average, those minority groups have relatively lower
GPAs and LSAT scores compared to whites and Asians.86 The school
emphasized that racial diversity is an important part of education because
exposure to others of various races helps students understand and be
sympathetic to heterogeneous viewpoints. 
87
In short, Michigan asserted that its interest in obtaining a diverse student
body is compelling and that the only way it can achieve that interest is by
granting preferences to certain minority groups.88
The court, however, rejected the school's argument. Its first task was to
determine the weight Michigan accords a prospective student's race. 89
The court found race not merely one factor considered among many, as
Michigan had argued; rather, it concluded that Michigan places "heavy
emphasis" on a student's race. 90 Despite the fact that the court accepted that
Michigan reviews each file individually and considers a multitude of factors
in evaluating whether to accept or reject an applicant, 91 it nonetheless
concluded that the law school "explicitly considers the race of applicants in
order to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented minority students. 92
Accordingly, the court next endeavored to determine whether racial diversity
is a compelling state interest.
93
Michigan proffered two policy rationales as support for its goal of
admitting a critical mass of diverse students. 94 The school first pointed to the
educational benefit of the "livelier, more spirited, and.., more enlightening"
classroom environment that results from the presence of students representing
83. Id. at 828.
84. Id. at 832-33.
85. Id. at 833.
86. Id. at 840.
87. Id. at 833-34.
88. See id. at 827-34.
89. See id. at 840.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 842.
92. Id. at 843.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 849-50.
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a variety of backgrounds and viewpoints. 95 The second benefit resulting from
racial diversity is the dismantling of racial stereotypes, which helps students
in a multi-racial setting become better prepared to engage in a democratic and
pluralistic society.
96
The district court found the identified benefits "laudable" but not
compelling. 97 Taking a cue from the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, the court first
concluded that the single vote cast for the diversity rationale in Bakke did not
warrant its recognition as a compelling state interest. 98 In addition, the court
concluded, the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Croson and Adarand
made it clear that remedying the effects of past discrimination is the only
compelling reason for government to create racial classifications. 99
Separately, the court went on to consider the policy rationales Michigan
advanced to justify its race-based admissions program as a remedy to the
discrimination minorities face in society.1l°  Michigan's evidence was
plentiful but ultimately not persuasive. 101
Michigan first defended its affirmative action admissions program as a
bulwark against the phenomenon of "cascading"--relegating minority
students to less selective institutions because of the difficulty in gaining
admittance to the more prestigious schools. 102 The foreseeable consequence
of cascading is to render the most able minority students overwhelmingly
isolated in top schools.' 
03
Michigan next underscored the necessity of an affirmative action
admissions program to "counterbalance the negative effects of racism on the
academic performance" of minority students. 1°4 Systematic deprivations in
housing and educational opportunities lead to a performance gap between
minorities and non-minorities.' 05 In addition, minorities encounter a racially
hostile environment at predominately white schools, which leaves them
feeling isolated, alienated, and discouraged, and thus reduces their desire to
succeed academically. 10
6
95. Id. at 849.
96. Id. at 850.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 847-48.
99. Id. at 849.
100. See id. at 855-72.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 859.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 859-60.
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The school finally defended its admissions program in four additional
ways: as a remedy to the bias in standardized testing;' °7 as a mechanism for
preventing resegregation; 108 as a means of enhancing the quality of education
for all students;' 0 9 and as a vehicle for aiding the integration of the legal
profession. 110
While the court recognized the United States's deplorable history of racial
discrimination and that its vestiges still linger, it found Michigan's arguments
neither compelling nor germane to the constitutional question. 1 ' In addition
to the fact that the court found much of Michigan's evidence to support its
assertions tenuous, 112 it also found the school's arguments legally flawed: The
court stated that the Constitution does not permit "the effects of general,
societal discrimination" to be "remedied by race-conscious decision-
making." ' 13  Moreover, the court concluded, whatever solution Michigan
intended to implement to forestall resegregation and eradicate the harmful
consequences of societal discrimination, the solution had to be race neutral. 
114
"The focus," the court declared, "must be upon the merit of individual
applicants, not upon assumed characteristics of racial groups. An admissions
policy that treats any applicants differently from others on account of their
race is unfair and unconstitutional." 1
5
In sum, the district court found the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action admissions program unconstitutional because the program's
purpose-to admit a racially diverse class-is not a compelling state interest,
and because Michigan's law school had not engaged in discrimination; rather,
the discrimination the school attempted to remedy was that imposed upon
minorities by society. 116
D. Grutter v. Bollinger in the United States Supreme Court: Educational
Diversity Endures as a Compelling State Interest
The anomalous nature of the Bakke opinion, in which a bulk of the
decisive constitutional analysis was delivered by a single Justice, has rendered
107. Id. at 860-61.
108. Id. at 860.
109. Id. at 862.
110. Id. at 863.
111. See id. at 863-72.
112. See id. at 864-68.
113. Id. at 869.
114. See id. at 871.
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 872.
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it difficult for lower courts to divine its legal principles. 117 Indeed, despite
Justice Powell's finding in Bakke that the educational benefits flowing from a
racially diverse student populace' constitute a compelling state interest, the
Hopwood court and the district court in Grutter refused to recognize Bakke's
plurality opinion as binding precedent."l 8 The Court's post-Bakke case law,
Hopwood, and Grutter, had eclipsed the portion of Bakke that endorsed
diversity as a constitutionally permissible justification for government-created
racial classifications. "9
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter, however, mutes any further
speculation of whether diversity persists as a compelling interest: a majority
of the Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, vindicated the diversity
rationale, and thus cemented its status as a compelling state interest when
invoked within the context of higher education. 
20
In announcing that student body diversity survives as a compelling state
interest, the Court conceded that its decisions since Bakke had created
justifiable confusion on the point.' 2' The Court acknowledged that Croson
stated that unless racial classifications are created for remedial purposes, they
may not be compelling; however, the Court also quickly noted that it had
"never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict
scrutiny is remedying past discrimination."' 122 Moreover, the Court had not
considered the constitutionality of the diversity rationale in the context of
higher education since Bakke. 23 As the Court put it, "[c]ontext matters."
Accordingly, "[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable," and it is thus critical to "carefully examin[e] the importance
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker
for the use of race in that particular context."
1 24
Beyond defending its holding by virtue of the unique context of higher
education, the Court further supported its conclusion that diversity is
compelling on a range of other grounds. 
25
First, the Court invoked the notion seized upon by Justice Powell in Bakke
117. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996);
Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000); Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
118. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944; Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 847-48.
119. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond, Inc. v. J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45; Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
120. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 327.
125. See id. at 328-33.
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that rooted in the Constitution is the precept of "educational autonomy."
Thus, universities retain the "freedom... to make [their] own judgments as to
education,"' 2 6 including the method for selecting their student bodies.
Consequently, the Court deferred to Michigan's judgment that "diversity is
essential to its educational mission."'' 27 In doing so, the Court explained that
"'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the
contrary."'
128
Second, the Court characterized Michigan's efforts to ensure that it
enrolled a "critical mass" of selected minority students not as constitutionally
impermissible racial balancing, but rather as a method of realizing the
"substantial" educational benefits that diversity produces. 129  Notably,
Michigan's admissions program promotes understanding among races and
helps to dissolve racial stereotypes, thereby leading to livelier classroom
discussion from which all students may benefit. 130  Additionally, the Court
continued, diversity among students prepares them to engage in an
increasingly diverse workforce and society. 131  Such preparedness is
indispensable for producing students fit for work and citizenship.
132
Accordingly, "the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless
of race or ethnicity."'
133
Moreover, institutions of higher education serve as training grounds for
America's future leaders. 134  "In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry," the Court concluded, "it is necessary
that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals
of every race and ethnicity." 13
5
In sum, the Court embraced the diversity rationale as constituting a
compelling state interest for three reasons. First, the Court recognized the
unique context of higher education. 136  Second, the Court yielded to
Michigan's educational autonomy, concluding that the school-not the
126. Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 408 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
127. Id. at 328.
128. Id. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 408 U.S. at 318-19 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
129. Id. at 329-30.
130. Id. at 330.
131. Id.
132. See id. at330-31.
133. Id. at 331.
134. Id. at 332.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 327.
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Court-knows how to best select its student body. 13 7  Finally, the Court
concluded that the diversity rationale is supported by the educational benefits
that result from the presence of a diverse student populace. 138
III. BEYOND POLICY: DIVERSITY AS A CONSTITUTIONALLY GROUNDED
JUSTIFICATION FOR RACIAL PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
ADMISSION PRACTICES
The Court correctly concluded that educational diversity qualifies as a
compelling state interest. As was the case with the Bakke Court, the Grutter
Court grounded its conclusion in the policy goals served by diversity. Indeed,
courts reviewing the constitutionality of the diversity rationale in the context
of higher education have assiduously considered and explained the policy
justifications for accepting or rejecting student body diversity as a compelling
state interest. 139 The courts, though, have conspicuously neglected to address
the notion that a university's interest in diversity 4 0 is rooted in constitutional
principles expressed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 141  It is from this
expression that diversity constitutes a compelling state interest.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides the
foundation for the diversity rationale. The Constitution espouses one of our
government's preeminent values in that clause-the political equality of all
members of our society. 142  The concept of majority rule inherent in a
democratic system, however, presents potential dangers that political equality
may not overcome. 143  Where majority rules, there lies the specter of it
137. See id. at 328-29.
138. Id. at 330-32.
139. See, e.g., Bakke, 408 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(accepting student body diversity as a compelling state interest); but see, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1033 (1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (rejecting student body diversity as a compelling state interest).
140. The compelling interest identified here is "diversity." The courts, however, vacillate
between identifying diversity itself and identifying the educational benefits that flow from diversity
as the interest at issue. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("the Law School has a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body") with id. at 333 (the "compelling interest in securing the
educational benefits of a diverse student body"). The Court is equivocal; however, critiquing the
distinction is beyond the scope of this Comment, It suffices, here, to target the interest as "diversity,"
because if educational benefits indeed flow from diversity, it is axiomatic that the presence of
diversity remains a precondition of realizing those benefits.
141. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
142. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. Liu, supra note 76, at 417.
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stamping out the fights of the minority. 144  In such event, not only are the
minority's rights threatened, but our constitutional order may be upended.
45
As De Tocqueville observed:
If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that
event may be attributed to the omnipotence of the majority,
which may at some future time urge the minorities to
desperation and oblige them to have recourse by physical
force. Anarchy will then be the result, but it will have been
brought about by despotism. 1
46
James Madison, credited as the chief architect of the U.S. Constitution,
147
expressed the same sentiment while championing the Constitution's
ratification. 48  He believed it imperative "not only to guard the society
against the oppression.of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part."' 149
While Madison's trepidation over the potential insurgency of majority
tyranny may be tempered by the size and pluralistic nature of our nation,
150
the majority will not inevitably consider every competing interest. 151  The
shackles of slavery and of the segregation laws,. which persisted into the
1960's, to point out only two examples, illustrate the majority's "propensity..
. to ignore or subordinate minority" interests. 152 Consequently, forestalling or
remedying majoritarian abuse and the injustice it wroughts is an everlasting
144. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (Philips Bradley ed., Kopf
1945) (1835).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See THE FEDERALIST (William R. Brock ed., 1992).
148. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (William R. Brock ed., 1992).
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 267 (James Madison) (William R. Brock ed., 1992).
150. In fact, Madison expressly argued that the threat of majoritarian tyranny is most present in
small societies and least present in large, pluralistic ones:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass
within which they are placed, the most easily will they concert and execute their
plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens....
Id. at 47.
151. Liu, supra note 76, at 418.
152. Id.
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constitutional concern.1
5 3
Indeed, out of such concern arose the inception of how the Court identifies
suspect classes meriting strict scrutiny review, as the Court announced in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. "that heightened judicial scrutiny of
majoritarian legislation may be justified where 'prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities ... tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."",15 4 The Court
recognized that prejudice prevents minorities from having their interests
served. 55 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment extends protection to "discrete
and insular minorities" not merely to ensure their political interests are served
while they face the perpetual threat of being outvoted, but also to alleviate the
effects of the prejudice that "perpetuates, and is perpetuated by, their isolation
and marginalization."1
56
A vital representative government is predicated on the active participation
of its citizens as well as on the protection of minority rights. 57 Prejudice
marginalizes minority groups; therefore, its eradication is essential to
preserving a robust democracy. 58  Because education "is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities,"'159 public universities
must shoulder the burden of providing an education "that anticipates the
demands of democratic politics.' 60  In particular, institutions of higher
education must provide to students an environment that promotes "cross racial
understanding"' 6' and consequently reverses the polarizing effects of racial
prejudice. 162
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause proscribes
invidious race discrimination by government entities. 63 If, as the Court has
held, the Constitution permits the creation of affmnative action programs to
remedy the present effects of past racial discrimination,' 64 then the
Constitution must also permit the creation of affirmative action programs
aimed at facilitating cross racial understanding.' 65 Thus, it is from the values
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
155. See id.
156. Id. at 419.
157. Id. at 422.
158. See id.
159. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
160. Liu, supra note 76, at 422.
161. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
162. See Liu, supra note 76, at 422.
163. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
164. Id. at 505.
165. See Liu, supra note 76, at 422.
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expressed by the words in the Fourteenth Amendment that merit student body
diversity being vindicated as a compelling state interest. 1
66
Having concluded that the Court correctly accepted educational diversity
as a compelling state interest, this Comment turns now to the federal district
court's and the Supreme Court's analysis resolving whether Michigan's plan
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
IV. JUDICIAL DISPUTE OVER WHETHER THE MICHIGAN PLAN AT ISSUE IN
GRUTrER Is NARROWLY TAILORED
Just as the district court and the Supreme Court arrived at different
conclusions over whether student body diversity constitutes a compelling state
interest, the two courts also reached disparate outcomes over whether
Michigan's admissions plan is narrowly tailored to achieve student body
diversity. The following traces the analysis each court undertook to answer
the question.
A. Federal District Court Conclusion: Michigan's Plan Is a "Far Cry "from
the "Close Fit" the Constitution Demands
Notwithstanding its conclusion that Michigan's admissions program
suffers the constitutional infirmity of not being supported by a compelling
interest, the federal district court went on to evaluate whether the program is
narrowly tailored. 167 The district court targeted five reasons why Michigan's
admissions program is not narrowly tailored to achieve its interest of
admitting a diverse group of students. 1
68
First, the court pointed out that Michigan failed to precisely define what
constitutes a "critical mass" of minority students. 169 It is virtually impossible,
the court commented, to achieve narrow tailoring where "the contours of the
interest being served are so ill-defined." 170
Second, the university failed to place a time limit on its use of racial
classifications in its admissions process. 171 While the school maintained that
it would discontinue using race as a factor in admissions when it was no
longer necessary to do so to obtain a critical mass of minority students, the
166. Id.
167. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
168. See id. at 850-52.
169. Id. at 850.
170. Id. at 851.
171. Id.
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court found that the open-ended nature of the program further illustrated the
program's insufficient tailoring. 1
72
Third, the court found that Michigan's admissions program is virtually
indistinguishable from an unconstitutional quota system. It noted that the
university had created a de facto minimum threshold of ten percent minority
enrollment as constituting a "critical mass.' 73  Such a program is not
narrowly tailored, the court found, because there exists no principled
difference between a fixed number of slots and a fixed minimum
percentage. 1
74
Fourth, the court inveighed against the plan's arbitrary selection of
protected groups. 175  Limiting preferred status to African Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans necessarily excludes other racial and ethnic
groups that have suffered discrimination. 176 Consequently, the "haphazard
selection of certain races," the court concluded, "is a far cry from the 'close
fit' between the means and the ends that the Constitution demands in order for
a racial classification to pass muster under strict scrutiny analysis."'
177
Finally, Michigan impermissibly failed to sufficiently investigate race-
neutral alternatives for achieving a critical mass of minority students.'78
Regardless of whether such race-neutral methods would effectively yield a
critical mass of minorities, "the law school's failure to consider them ... prior
to implementing an explicitly race-conscious system militates against a
finding of narrow tailoring." 179
B. The Supreme Court Analysis: Michigan's Plan Is Narrowly Tailored
In contrast to the conclusion reached by the district court, the Supreme
Court concluded that Michigan's admissions plan comports with the
requirements of narrow tailoring.' 80 The Court highlighted three reasons why
Michigan's program embodies a narrowly tailored plan. 181
First, the Court determined that the law school's program does not
operate as a quota system; rather, the program is sufficiently tailored to allow
172. Seeid. at851.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 851-52.
176. Id. at 852.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 853.
180. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
181. See id. at 334.
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race to be considered as a "plus" factor in the admissions process. 182
Second, the program provides for "individualized consideration" of each
applicant-a "paramount" consideration in the context of a race-conscious
admissions program. 183 Michigan sufficiently demonstrated that all factors
included in an applicant's file are considered along with his or her race and
that the school accords those factors "substantial weight." 
184
Moreover, related to the consideration of individualized review of each
file, the Court sought to ensure that Michigan's program does not "unduly
burden" students who are not members of the program's preferred minority
groups.185 The Court concluded that Michigan's program imposes no such
burden because, by allowing the school to consider "'all pertinent elements of
diversity,"' it ensures that the school may admit non-minority applicants over
its targeted minority applicants. 16
Finally, to conclude that Michigan had considered race-neutral
alternatives to its race-based program187 and that Michigan's program would
"be limited in time."1 8 8 the Court deferentially yielded to the school's good
faith. 189
Without exploring the race-neutral alternatives the school had in fact
considered before implementing its race-conscious program, the Court
dismissed the alternatives suggested by the district court-such as employing
a lottery or de-emphasizing an applicant's GPA or LSAT score-because they
would have forced Michigan to sacrifice its racial diversity, academic
prestige, or both.' 90 Instead, the Court chose to "take the Law School at its
word that it would 'like nothing better than to find a race neutral admissions
formula. '" 191
The Court likewise granted Michigan deference on the issue of limiting
the time span of programs providing for racial preferences. 92 Michigan has
not provided for a precise end-date for its race-based program. 193  But the
182. Id. at 334-36.
183. Id. at 337.
184. Id. at 337-38.
185. Id. at 341.
186. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 408 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
187. Id. at 339-40.
188. Id. at 343.
189. Id. at 339-43.
190. Id. at 339-40.
191. Id. at 343 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 34, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241)).
192. See id.
193. See id.
2006]
MARQUEITE LA W REVIEW
school is able to comply with the Court's time limitation because the Court
again took the school "at its word that it. . . will terminate its race-conscious
admissions program as soon as practicable." 1
94
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE ADMISSIONS PLAN AT
ISSUE IN GRUTTER IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE PLAN IS NOT
NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE THE COMPELLING INTEREST OF
EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY
The Court erred in concluding that Michigan's admissions program is
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of educational
diversity. First, the program is deficiently underinclusive, and thus does not
comport with strict scrutiny's mandate that there exist a "close fit" between
the government interest and the means chosen to further that interest. 95
Second, the Court's deference to Michigan's "academic freedom" was
misplaced.
A. Michigan's Admissions Program Is Deficiently Underinclusive
The "close fit" requirement has generally become known to mean that, for
a court to deem a classification narrowly tailored, the classification may not
be either too overinclusive or too underinclusive. 196  In the context of
affirmative action, a classification is overinclusive if it benefits individuals
who fall outside the scope of the plan's stated interest. 97 In contrast, a
classification is underinclusive if it fails to benefit individuals who are
similarly situated to those who are benefited by the program. 98  In other
words, "[t]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."' 99  Michigan's admissions plan suffers the constitutional
194. Id.
195. See id. at 333.
196. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 644-47 (15th
ed. 2004).
197. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989). The City of Richmond's
affirmative action program included Eskimos and Aleuts among the program's potential
beneficiaries. Id. The Court observed, however, that "[i]t may well be that Richmond has never had
an Aleut or Eskimo citizen." Consequently, the Court deemed Richmond's program "gross[ly]
overinclusive[ ]." Id.
198. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 196, at 644-47.
199. See id. at 644 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)).
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infirmities of creating such "arbitrary" classifications and of disregarding
individuals who belong to minority groups warranting preference along with
the school's targeted groups.
To arrive at its conclusion that Michigan's plan is narrowly tailored, the
Court ignored the district court's conclusion that there is no principled method
upon which Michigan selects the minorities it prefers. 20 0 While the plan itself
identifies African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans as groups
targeted for preference, the law school bulletin indicates that particular
attention is given to African Americans, Mexican Americans, Native
Americans, and Puerto Ricans raised on the U.S. mainland.20 '
The discrepancies attending Michigan's choice of groups targeted for
special preference reveals the program's underinclusive nature. For instance,
as the district court pointed out, Michigan gives a "special commitment" to
African Americans, but ostensibly excludes blacks hailing from other parts of
the globe.20 2 The court also emphasized that giving preference to Mexican
Americans leaves out other individuals of Hispanic dissent who do not
originate from Mexico.20 3 In addition, the district court underscored how
illogical it is for the university to distinguish between Puerto Ricans who are
raised on U.S. soil and those who are raised elsewhere. 204 Furthermore, other
ethnic and racial groups besides the ones Michigan favors have also suffered
discrimination.20 5  The district court specifically identified "Arabs and
southern and eastern Europeans" as such victims.
20 6
In short, Michigan's "haphazard ' 20 7 selection of the races it chooses to
favor with its admissions program typifies the underinclusive classifying
prohibited by narrow tailoring. 20 8  "The purpose of the narrow tailoring
requirement is to ensure that 'the means chosen "fit" th[e] compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype,,' 20 9 The Court has repeatedly
referred to the "close fit" as measured by the degree that a classification is
overinclusive or underinclusive.21° Yet, the Grutter Court glossed over the
200. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306 (2003).
201. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851-52 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
202. Id. at 852.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 196, at 644-47.
209. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306, 333 (2003) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
210. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 196, at 644-47.
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underinclusive nature of Michigan's admission program.2 1
B. The Court's Deference to Michigan 's "Academic Freedom" Was
I Misplaced
Beyond disregarding the underinclusive 'character of Michigan's
admissions program, the Court, citing the university's "constitutional
dimension ' 212 of academic freedom, accorded the school substantial deference
in concluding it had adequately considered race-neutral alternatives and
would end its race-based program when "practicable. 21 3  The Court's
deference to the school is misplaced. Michigan, in fact, failed to adequately
consider race-neutral alternatives to its plan,214 and it has not complied with
the constitutional mandate of placing a time limit on its racial preferences.1 5
Both failures further undermine the Court's conclusion that Michigan's
admissions program is narrowly tailored.
The district court found that Michigan did not adequately consider race-
neutral alternatives before implementing its admissions plan; 216 yet, the Court
accepted that the university had considered such alternatives without requiring
it to explain precisely which alternatives it had considered.21 7 The Court thus
ignored one of its own admonitions of affirmative action jurisprudence: The
Court previously stated that whether the government entity first considers
race-neutral means for achieving its objectives before creating its racial
classifications is a factor for deciding whether a program is narrowly
tailored. 218 As a justification for its lax inquiry of the race-neutral alternatives
Michigan considered, the Court relied upon the university's "educational
autonomy ' 219 in deciding how to best accomplish its mission of obtaining a
racially diverse student body.22°
The Court stated that "[w]e are satisfied that the Law School adequately
considered race-neutral alternatives currently capable of producing a critical
mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that
211. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
212. Id. at 329.
213. Id. at 343.
214. See id. at 339-40.
215. See id. at 341-43.
216. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 852-53 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
217. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-41.
218. Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
219. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
220. Id. at 328.
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is the cornerstone of its educational mission.,, 22 1 Thus, the Court allowed
Michigan to substitute its interest in retaining an elite law school for the
constitutional mandate of considering race-neutral alternatives.222
The Court granted Michigan similar deference when considering the
Constitution's requirement that race preferences be "limited in time. ' 2 3
Because a "core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with
all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race[,]" a narrowly
tailored race-based affirmative action program must have a "logical end
point" to ensure that the program is "employed no more broadly than the
interest demands. 224 The Court readily asserted that racial classifications are
"dangerous" and, if not tempered by a time limit, threaten the Constitution's
tenet of assuring equality. 225  Yet, evidently, the danger is not of such
imminence or eminence to require an academic institution to produce
evidence to support its claim that its affirmative action program will cease at
some future date.226 The Court, instead, merely "take[s] the Law School at its
word that it ... will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon
as practicable. 227
The Court's deference with regard to whether Michigan considered race-
neutral alternatives and whether it will adopt a self-imposed time limit on its
admissions plan is misplaced. First, as Justice Thomas points out, the First
Amendment does not "countenance the unprecedented deference the Court
gives to the Law School . . ,228 Second, the Court ignores its own
pronouncement from Croson cautioning against judicial deference.229
Under strict scrutiny, the First Amendment does not entitle academic
institutions to any judicial deference.23 °  Justice Thomas recounts the
precedential history shaping the Court's conclusion that the First Amendment
grants institutions "educational autonomy" to the degree that they should be
accorded judicial grace when constructing racial classifications.2 3' He is
incredulous that the case law leads to the conclusion to which the majority
says it leads.232
221. Id. at 340.
222. See id. at 355-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
224. Id. at 341-42.
225. Id. at 342.
226. See id. at 343.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989).
230. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. Id. at 362-64.
232. See id.
2006]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
The notion of academic freedom, he points out, originated from Sweezy v.
New Hampshire-a case in which the Court held that the investigation of a
suspected subversive who had given a university lecture violated due
process. 233  The majority opinion in that case reasoned that the right of
academic freedom created by the First Amendment prohibited the
investigation.23 5 Thomas next notes that in Bakke Justice Powell extrapolated
from Sweezy "that the First Amendment somehow protected a public
university's use of race in admission., 235  The majority in Grutter,
accordingly, relied upon Bakke to support its claim that universities are
entitled to deference.236 However, as Thomas observes, the case precedents
"provide[] no answer to the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions are relaxed when applied to public universities. ' 237 Hence, the
First Amendment does not authorize public universities to do what is
otherwise proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 238
In addition, the Court itself, in its decision in Croson, cautioned against
granting government bodies the very type of deference it granted the
University of Michigan. 239  The Court in Croson acknowledged that,
generally, government is "entitled . . . [to] deferential review by the
judiciary. 24 °  The standard changes, however, when governmental
classifications invoke a suspect class.2 4' In such circumstances, a court
should withhold granting any deference to the government. "The history of
racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to
legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal
protection analysis. 242
The Court's deference to the university is wholly antithetical to the rigid
review that strict scrutiny requires.243 In fact, "[t]he Court confuses deference
to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the
implementation of [its] goal."'244 As a consequence, Michigan is permitted to
233. See id. at 362 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957)).
234. Id. at 363 (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 256-57).
235. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 408 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989).
240. Id. at 501.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
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subvert the strict scrutiny standard.245
The Constitution does not countenance the deference the Court eagerly
accorded the university.246  Nor does the pervasive "danger" 247 of racial
classifications militate in favor of granting such deference to government
actors who create racial preferences. 248 Accordingly, Michigan's failure to
articulate the race-neutral alternatives it considered before enacting its
affirmative action admissions program 249 as well as its failure to include a
sunset provision in its program 250 further demonstrates that its program is not
narrowly tailored to achieve its interest.
In sum, the Court erred in upholding Michigan's admissions program.
While Michigan devised the program to achieve the constitutionally
permissible goal of educational diversity, the program fails to further that goal
through narrowly tailored means. First, the program's "haphazard" selection
of those meriting admissions preference demonstrates its
underinclusiveness. 251 Second, the Court's deference to Michigan allowed
the school to invoke its First Amendment entitlement to "educational
autonomy ' 252 to escape from showing how its plan comports with the Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence: the school was not forced to
demonstrate that it had considered race-neutral alternatives before adopting its
race-based plan; 253 nor was the school required to incorporate a time limit for
considering racial preferences into the plan. 254 Accordingly, Michigan's plan
fails to capture the "close fit" between the compelling state interest and the
means chosen to further that interest and is therefore unconstitutional.
The next section of this Comment attempts to show that an economic
affirmative action plan may remedy the constitutional problems afflicting
Michigan's plan. Economic affirmative action plans provide greater
inclusiveness than race-based plans. In addition, the plans themselves are
race neutral. Finally, economic affirmative action plans offer universities that
adopt such plans both the educational benefits of equality of opportunity and
potentially achieving a diverse student body as well as the legal benefit of
having challenges to such economic affirmative action plans subjected to a
245. See id. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 362-64 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
248. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989).
249. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
250. See id. at 341-43.
251. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
252. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
253. See id. at 339-41.
254. See id. at 343.
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lower standard of review than strict scrutiny.255
VI. A NARROWLY TAILORED, RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVE TO RACIAL
PREFERENCES: ECONOMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny demands both that
government ensure there exists a "close fit" between the compelling interest
and the means chosen to advance that interest, 256 and that government
consider race-neutral alternatives before developing racial classifications.257
The "close fit" requirement is generally measured by a classification's relative
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness.1
58
As argued above, Michigan's admissions plan, by extending preference to
only select minority groups to the exclusion of other minority groups who
have also suffered discrimination, is patently underinclusive. In addition, in
deferring to the notion of Michigan's academic freedom, the Court accepted
in good faith that the school had explored race-neutral alternatives to its
program without fully investigating what those alternatives were. 259 But the
district court, meanwhile, had extended the school no such deference and, in
the course of its investigation, concluded that Michigan had failed to
sufficiently consider race-neutral alternatives to its plan. 26 Hence,
Michigan's admissions plan suffers from the twin constitutional infirmities of
underinclusiveness and of being implemented before other race-neutral
alternatives were considered.
Class-based affirmative action represents a remedy to both shortcomings.
A class-based plan would target the poor for preference in college admissions
rather than racial minorities. Class-based affirmative action, therefore,
provides for greater inclusiveness than sheer race-based plans because all
individuals from depressed socioeconomic backgrounds qualify for preference
regardless of their race. Accordingly, by discounting race, class-based
affirmative action inherently embodies a race-neutral alternative to a race-
based plan.
Other benefits, as well, accrue from class-based affirmative action.
255. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
256. Id. at 333.
257. Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
258. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 196, at 644-47.
259. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
260. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
[89:845
GRUTTER'S DICHOTOMY
A. Equality of Opportunity
The poor have long lacked opportunities available to those from more
wealthy segments of society. 261 Discrimination has stunted the advancement
262of the poor just as it has stunted the advancement of racial minorities.
Class preferences offer the promise of equal educational opportunity-a goal
the Court champions:
This Court has long recognized that "education ... is the very
foundation of good citizenship." For this reason, the
diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all
individuals.... ." [E]nsuring that public institutions are open
and available to all segments of American society . . .
represents a paramount government objective." And,
"[n]owhere is the importance of such openness more acute
than in the context of higher education.,
263
Moreover, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.-a strong advocate for class-based
affirmative action-observed, "'[i]t is a simple matter of justice . . . that
America, in dealing creatively with the task of raising the Negro from
backwardness, should also be rescuing a large stratum of the forgotten white
poor."'' 264 Class-based affirmative action expounds the equality and justice to
which the Court and Dr. King refer by providing the white poor as well as the
minority poor access to education.
B. Obtaining Educational Diversity Through Race-Blind Economic
Affirmative Action Is a Viable Prospect
What is more, while supplying opportunities for low-income whites,
public universities may still be able to achieve the compelling interest of
racial diversity via race-neutral, class-based admissions practices. Even
though the scholarship is divided on this point,265 as Figure One helps
261. See generally Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1037 (1996).
262. See id. at 1061.
263. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32 (internal citations omitted).
264. Kahlenberg, supra note 261, at 1062 (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KiNG JR., WHY WE
CAN'T WAIT 147 (1963)).
265. See, e.g., id.; R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending
Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2001) (defending class-based affirmative
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illustrate, U.S. Census statistics reveal minorities perhaps constitute a "critical
mass" of low wage earners and of those in poverty.266
Figure One is divided into three primary income segments. The first
segment shows the total white and total minority households earning $29,999
or less in income for 2003. Minorities constituted thirty percent of all such
households. In addition, minority households represented twenty-four percent
of households receiving between $30,000 and $59,999 in income. Finally,
among households earning $60,000 or more, eighteen percent were minority
households.
The data reveal that, if an admissions program were to adopt a class-based
preference plan that discounted an individual's race, a significant number of
racial minorities would benefit from receiving class preference. Michigan
consistently admitted a class comprised of at least ten percent of its targeted
267
minority groups. Minority households represented thirty percent of
households earning the lowest income in 2003. Thus, by targeting the poorest
segment of society for admission preference, public universities may still be
able to admit a "critical mass" of minority students.
action as a viable method for obtaining racially diverse classrooms); but see, e.g., Deborah C.
Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUc. 452 (1997) (arguing class-
based affirmative action is an inferior substitute for race-based affirmative action); Tung Yin, A
Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative Action, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 213
(1996) (deriding the notion that racial diversity in public universities can be obtained through race-
neutral class preferences).
266. While the Census statistics reveal that racial minorities constitute a significant percentage
of the lowest wage earners in 2003, test scores are not uniform across racial categories. See Yin,
supra note 265, at 233-35. According to Yin, black students, for example, comprise roughly only
fifteen percent "of the applicant pool scoring above 977 points" on the SAT among households
earning less than $10,000 per year. Id. at 235. Consequently, Yin contends that because universities
use standardized test scores as one primary admission criterion, the beneficiaries of class-based
affirmative action "are likely to be overwhelmingly white." Id. However, Yin's data set is
incomplete, as it compares whites with only blacks rather than all other racial minorities. See id. at
233-35. A rigorous examination of the empirical test-score data across all races is beyond the scope
of this Comment. This Comment's purpose is not to irrefutably demonstrate that class-based
affirmative action will necessarily yield diverse university classes; rather, it attempts to show that the
socio-economic data reveal that minorities comprise a substantial proportion of individuals falling on
the lower end of the socio-economic ladder, and thus universities instituting race-neutral, class-based
admissions plans will have a significant number of racial minorities comprising their targeted
populace. Hence, achieving educational diversity through race-neutral means remains a possibility.
267. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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FIGURE 1
Household Income-2003
11,117 represents 11,117,000
Income Interval Grand Total Total % Total %
White White Minority Minority
Under $10,000 11,117 7,012 63% 4,105 37%
$10,000-14,999 8,487 6,035 71% 2,452 29%
$15,000-$19,999 8,306 5,926 71% 2,380 29%
$20,000-$24,999 8,065 5,827 72% 2,238 28%
$25,000-$29,999 7,502 5,479 73% 2,023 27%
Total 43,477 30,279 70% 13,198 30%
Income Interval Grand Total Total % Total %
White White Minority Minority
$30,000-$34,999 7,338 5,412 74% 1,926 26%
$35,000-$39,999 6,661 4,954 74% 1,707 26%
$40,000-$44,999 6,376 4,765 75% 1,611 25%
$45,000-$49,999 5,330 4,096 77% 1,234 23%
$50,000-$59,999 9,826 7,676 78% 2,150 22%
Total 35,531 26,903 76% 8,628 24%
Income Interval Grand Total Total % Total %
White White Minority Minority
$60,000-$74,999 11,786 9,346 79% 2,440 21%
$75,000-$99,999 12,972 10,612 82% 2,360 18%
$100,000-$149,999 11,115 9,309 84% 1,806 16%
$150,000-$199,999 3,491 2,933 84% 558 16%
$200,000 and over 2,947 2,578 87% 369 13%
Total 42,311 34,778 82% 7,533 18%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, p.
462, Figure No. 676.
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The prospect is even more stark when one examines the data in Figure
Two showing the number of children living below the poverty level.
FIGURE 2
Persons Below Poverty Level-2003
16,283 represents 16,283,000
Income Interval Grand Total % Total %
Total Whites White Minorities Minority
Under 18 years old 16,283 7,985 49% 8,298 51%
18 to 24 years old 5,463 3,202 59% 261 41%
Total 21,746 11,187 51% 10,559 49%
Income Interval Grand Total % Total %
Total Whites. White Minorities Minority
25 to 64 years old 17,767 10;419 59% 7,348 41%
65 years old and older 3,903 2,666 68% 1,237 32%
Total 21,670 13,085 60% 8,585 40%
Grand Total 43,416 24,272 56% 19,144 44%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, p.
473, Figure No. 696.
Figure Two reveals that minorities constitute fifty-one percent of persons
under eighteen living below the poverty line. Accordingly, race-blind
admissions programs granting preference to those living below the poverty
level are likely to admit a number of minoriies as a result.
C. Legal Advantages to Class-Based Preferences
An additional advantage of a class-based affirmative action program is
that, though it grants preferences to some individuals over others, such a
program likely satisfies the Constitution's strictures. A reviewing court
would subject a class-based program to one of two constitutional tests:
"rational basis review" or "strict scrutiny." A class-based program could
survive either.
1. Rational Basis Review
Economic disadvantage does not constitute a suspect class.
2 68
268. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Consequently, it is unlikely that programs creating preferences for the poor
would be subjected to strict scrutiny.269 In lieu of strict scrutiny review, such
programs would instead be stibjected to the rational basis review standard.
Under rational basis review, the classification must rationally further a
legitimate state interest. 270 Thus, because ensuring educational opportunities
remain open to all segments of society no doubt constitutes a legitimate state
interest, 271 economic affirmative action admissions plans would be
adjudicated constitutional under the rational basis review standard.
2. Strict Scrutiny
A court would still subject a class-based admissions plan to strict scrutiny,
however, if a defendant demonstrates that the facially neutral plan was
designed to. have a racially discriminatory impact.272 Thus, if a university
creates an economic affirmative action program as a means for obtaining a
"critical mass" of minority students, a reviewing court will subject the
program to strict scrutiny.273 Nevertheless, such a program would assuredly
pass constitutional muster.
First, the Grutter Court found the diversity rationale compelling.274
Second, a class-based admissions program would be narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest of racial diversity as long as it complied with
certain constitutional mandates. For instance, a university must ensure that
275the program creates preferences rather than "quotas" for racial minorities.
Additionally, if racial diversity is the university's ultimate objective, the
school must maintain a system of "individualized review" of its application
files.276 In other words, a student's poor socio-economic background may not
be the determinative factor in her admission; rather, her economically
depressed circumstance must be considered merely as a "plus" in her file and
thus be considered along with her other credentials.277 Finally, as a class-
based plan stands as a facially race-neutral one, the need for a university to
consider race-neutral alternatives as well as time limits for its program is
obviated.
269. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
270. See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
271. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 301-02 (2003).
272. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
273. See id.
274. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
275. Id. at 335.
276. Id. at 336-37.
277. Id. at 336-39.
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Thus, a class-based affirmative action plan that is facially neutral, but
implemented to achieve racial diversity, would nonetheless satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard by comporting with each of these requirements.
In sum, myriad benefits accompany a university's use of an economic
affirmative action plan. If two of the aims of race-based affirmative action
plans are to atone for past discrimination and to ensure equality of educational
opportunities, then class-based plans achieve the same result, but across all
races. In addition, because racial minorities constitute a large portion of
society's poorer segments, universities may still be able to obtain the
advantages of racially diverse student bodies, but through race-neutral means.
Finally, class preferences hold the advantage of not automatically invoking
the legally daunting strict scrutiny review. Regardless of the constitutional
standard to which a court subjects a class-based plan, however, almost
invariably the plan will be upheld.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter solidified educational diversity
as a compelling state interest. 278 While the Court specifically reasoned that
the policy interests of dismantling racial stereotypes, preparing students to
engage in a diversified workforce, and ensuring pathways to leadership
remain unobstructed for individuals of all races justified its conclusion,2 79
educational diversity also remains a compelling state interest because it is
rooted in constitutional precepts.28°
Despite educational diversity's standing as a compelling state interest,
however, the admissions program at issue in Grutter should have been
invalidated as unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. First, it fails to account for individuals who are similarly situated
to those benefited under its terms. A number of other minority groups merit
preference along with those groups targeted by Michigan's plan. As such, the
plan is impermissibly underinclusive. 281 Second, Michigan failed to consider
race-neutral alternatives before enacting its plan as well as failed to impose a
time limit on its racial preferences.282 Thus, Michigan's plan does not satisfy
the strictures of narrow tailoring.
In contrast, admissions plans targeting prospective students based on their
278. Id. at 328.
279. Id. at 330-32.
280. See supra Part III.
281. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 196, at 644-47.
282. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851-52 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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socio-economic class, rather than their race, do comport with constitutional
mandates. A class-based program does not invoke a suspect classification.283
Accordingly, a reviewing court would likely subject such a program to
rational basis review instead of strict scrutiny. If the plan were constructed,
however, for the purpose of conferring benefits on the basis of one's race,
strict scrutiny would be the standard to which the court would subject it.284
Nevertheless, the plan would still likely withstand strict scrutiny review
because class-based plans embody the type of race-neutral alternative that the
Constitution requires.285 Moreover, because racial minorities comprise a
disproportionate number of individuals falling into the lowest socio-economic
class segment,286 schools may still be able to achieve the compelling interest
of attaining a racially diverse student body through a race-blind economic
affirmative action program. Economic affirmative action plans thus confer
the dual benefits of granting preferences to the white poor as well as
disadvantaged minorities, rendering such plans more fully inclusive than plans
that target strictly based upon one's race.
In sum, while the Grutter Court correctly concluded that educational
diversity is a compelling state interest, it incorrectly concluded that
Michigan's plan is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. An economic
affirmative action plan is superior to a race-based affirmative action plan
because it grants benefits to a more inclusive populace of disadvantaged
individuals and thus more fully embodies the constitutional precept of the
inherent equality of all members of our society.
DOUGLAS M. RAINES
283. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
284. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
285. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003).
286. See supra Part VI.B.
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